ADR-0019: Slow-ramp GNSS spoofing is not detectable with IMU and GNSS alone¶
Context¶
The slow-ramp experiment shows the filter follows a ramp of 0.05 to 2 m/s in every run, on two datasets and two settings. The gate reacts only to the fastest ramps and only with the default noise, and a faulty declaration does not stop the capture.
Options¶
- Document the limit. Track A's exit test states that spoof detection needs a second independent source.
- Add a rate-of-change check against the IMU. It can only see ramps above what the IMU's own error growth allows, which the data suggests is a few m/s, not the slow ramps measured here.
- Make a second source a requirement. Vision, a barometer or a map, to be tested in the same experiment.
Decision¶
Option 1. The limit is documented: with an IMU and GNSS alone, a slow-ramp spoof is not detectable, and the filter follows it. Track A's exit test is stated as not meetable for spoofing without a second independent source. No rate check is added, because the data show the ramps that matter sit below what the IMU can distinguish from its own error growth. Option 3, a second source as a requirement, is the follow-up experiment and is not started.
The limit is recorded in the limitations (L6), the risk log (R10) and the roadmap. The shipped configuration is unchanged.
Consequences¶
Whatever is chosen, the claim stays limited to simulated GNSS, one direction and two datasets.